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 1 
Violence by royal command: a judicial ‘moment’ (1574-1575) 
 
On 26 June 1574, Gabriel de Lorges, comte de Montgomery and Huguenot commander, was 
executed in Paris. Propaganda condoning his fate quickly appeared. Printed discourses 
claimed that not only was Montgomery a ‘true monster … born to subvert and ruin this 
kingdom’ and leader of conspirators and rebels, but that he had shown ‘sacrilegious 
disloyalty’. Over a period of thirteen to fourteen years, he had taken up arms against the king 
no less than five times (suggesting that the crown had been more than patient with him), and 
that in the end he had been ‘salarié’, that is had received his just desserts as a non-repentant 
rebel.1 By contrast, other sources report that on the scaffold he refused to confess or repent, 
declaring that ‘he would die for his religion, that he had not committed treason, nor anything 
else against his prince’, and prayed ‘as those of his religion’ did.2 Montgomery’s execution 
thus divided contemporary opinion. His gratuitous cruelty and repeated sedition were cited as 
justification for his sentence, whereas his piety and restraint contradicted this same verdict. 
This event might seem disconnected from the better known St Bartholomew’s Day massacres 
which preceded it, but, when seen in its wider context, it forms part of an apparent shift in the 
French monarchy’s attitude which was embodied in its enforcement of judicial violence. In 
turn, this change in approach can best be seen as a royal response both to the radicalization of 
the Huguenot movement and to the fears of subsequent plots, involving both Protestants and 
Catholics, in the wake of the massacres. 
                                                          
1 La Prinse du comte de Montgommery (1574); Discours de la mort et execution de Gabriel Comte de 
Montgommery … (Poitiers, 1574), both reprinted in Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France depuis Louis XI 
jusqu’à Louis XVIII, eds L. Cimber & F. Danjou (1836), viii [hereafter Archives curieuses], 225-53. 
2 P. de L’Estoile, Registre-Journal du règne de Henri III, eds M. Lazard & G. Schrenck (Geneva, 1992), i. 64-6; 
J-A. de Thou, Histoire universelle de Jacque-Auguste de Thou, depuis 1543 jusqu’en 1607 (1734), vii, 86-7. 
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The brutality of St Bartholomew’s Day and the responsibility for it has long 
dominated historiographical debate.3 The years immediately following, including the 
transition between the reigns of Charles IX and Henri III, have attracted far less attention.4 
The massacres of 1572 resolved little and, yet, cast a long shadow. The strain between the 
crown and the French nobility was particularly evident and relations remained extremely 
tense. Both the events which took place in the aftermath of the violence, and the royal 
response to the continuing tensions, are revealing. Discontented and fearful individuals 
among the grands responded to the uncertainty about royal policy by reconfiguring existing 
alliances. The resulting association between the Huguenot leadership and the moderate 
Catholics, or ‘catholiques associés’, increased the monarchy’s sense of vulnerability. Foreign 
intervention in the confessional conflict, in support of these groups, was another major 
concern. The crown sought a judicial solution in order to deal with those posing a particular 
threat to its authority. As a consequence, in the space of a few short months in 1574, the 
monarchy gave orders for several high-profile noble trials and executions as well as 
aristocratic imprisonments. Further action was taken the following year. By targeting those 
involved in conspiracies and military action against it, the crown sought to reinforce its 
legitimacy and strengthen its authority through the imposition of extraordinary royal justice. 
From a close examination of these events, both the weaknesses and strengths of such a 
strategy are evident. Significantly, this brutal reaction by the crown to the dangerous position 
in which it found itself following the massacres was distinctive from its approach both before 
and after 1574-75. It is this judicial ‘moment’ that will be explored here. 
                                                          
3 For the best and most comprehensive overview, A. Jouanna, The St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. The 
Mysteries of a Crime of State, trans. J. Bergin (Manchester, 2013); on the violence, Ritual and Violence: Natalie 
Davis and Early Modern France, eds G. Murdock, P. Roberts & A. Spicer (Oxford, 2012). 
4 The fullest account is Francis de Crue, Le Parti des politiques au lendemain de la Saint-Barthélemy. La Molle 
et Coconat (1892). Among the few modern works which discuss these events in any detail: M. P. Holt, The 
Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion (Cambridge, 1986), 38-43; Jouanna, The 
St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 213-15; A. Jouanna, Le Devoir de révolte. La noblesse française et la 





From around 1560, European rulers ceased to burn dissenters as heretics, thereby creating 
martyrs, and began instead to hang them as rebels and traitors, shifting the focus from 
religious dissent to the political crime of treason. This wider emphasis on sedition rather than 
confessional difference as the issue when determining punishment was evident in France.5 As 
the monarchy embraced a policy of religious toleration and coexistence in the 1560s, 
negotiating peace with the Reform movement and releasing dissenters, judicial prosecution of 
Huguenots declined sharply. However, the picture looks rather different by the mid-1570s, 
when there was more sustained labelling of the Huguenots as rebels and disturbers of the 
peace just as they had been in the pre-war period. Now they were connected not only with 
alleged plots against the crown, but the defection of leading Catholics, notably the king’s 
youngest brother, François, duc d’Alençon, as well as members of the house of Montmorency 
and others labelled as malcontents. As a result, the crown resorted to desperate measures in 
order to curb the seditious tendencies of an increasingly disgruntled nobility, but, 
significantly, by pursuing their agents and followers rather than the grands themselves. 
 There was nothing new in the emergence of noble dissent. Both contemporaries and 
later historians remark on the similarities between the monarchy’s position in the mid-1570s 
and its confrontation with the League of the Public Weal (or Bien Public) in the 1460s.6 In 
the sixteenth century, Huguenot rhetoric several times mobilized rights of resistance to 
tyranny and claims to defend the ‘bien public’, notably in the 1560 conspiracy of Amboise 
and the 1567 surprise of Meaux.7 The royal response was inhibited, however, by the need to 
                                                          
5 D. Nicholls, ‘The Theatre of Martyrdom in the French Reformation’, Past and Present, 121 (1988), 49-73. 
6 Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion, eds A. Jouanna, J. Boucher, D. Biloghi, G. Le Thiec (1998), 
222, 231; Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, ed. E. Albèri (Florence, 1860), iv, 329-30. 
7 Jouanna, Devoir de révolte, 9, 145-6, 153-4, 158-60, 393-4. 
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appease the Huguenots in order to maintain public order. The events of 1572 arose from an 
exceptional set of circumstances in which the crown had both the motive and the means to 
eliminate the Huguenot leadership with the gathering for Henri de Navarre’s wedding to the 
king’s sister, Marguerite. The tense atmosphere in which each side believed that the other 
was actively plotting against it continued into the following period. The massacres, therefore, 
can be seen as a botched attempt to resolve the issues arising from confessional division and, 
much more so, the crown’s need to reassert its authority. The residue of unfinished business 
which the violence left behind is clear. While Admiral Gaspard de Coligny and other leading 
figures in the Huguenot movement had been eliminated, others had escaped or, in the case of 
the princes of the blood Navarre and Henri, prince de Condé, were under effective house 
arrest having been forced to convert to Catholicism. Pressure on the crown was compounded 
by the regrouping of the Huguenots in the south-west and the successful defiance of La 
Rochelle, besieged by royal forces in 1573, as well as resistance in Normandy and elsewhere. 
Furthermore, rumours of other conspiracies against the crown continued to circulate, and the 
attempts to free Navarre and Alençon from royal control compounded these concerns. This, 
in turn, led to greater fears and ever-tighter vigilance over the princes. The death of Charles 
IX at the end of May, and the subsequent three-month regency of Catherine de Medici while 
the return from Poland of the new king, Henri III, was eagerly awaited, fuelled this 
atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty. 
Two months after the massacres, the judicial process had already claimed its first 
victims. François de Briquemault and Arnaud de Cavaignes, Coligny’s lieutenants, were 
hanged on 27 October 1572 for their leading part in the supposed plot against the crown.8 
Both had played prominent roles in the Huguenot movement and were well known to the 
                                                          
8 A[rchives ]N[ationales], U//785, fo.117 (23 Oct.); AN, X2a, 940 (28 Oct.). C. Haton, Mémoires, ed. L. 
Bourquin (2002), ii, 461; Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, eds A. Desjardins & G. 
Canestrini (1865), iii, 853-4. 
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authorities.9 They had been arrested a few days after the massacre after a frenzied search for 
them and other significant survivors.10 The most prominent of these were Jean de Maligny, 
the vidame de Chartres, and the comte de Montgomery who had successfully fled to 
England.11 An effigy of Coligny was posthumously judged, sentenced and hanged alongside 
Briquemault and Cavaignes, signalling the legitimacy of his assassination.12 Arlette Jouanna 
comments that ‘these trials have too often been neglected or derided as parodies of justice’ 
and describes them as acts of ‘ordinary’ justice.13 More than this, however, they should be 
seen as the first in a wave of judicial executions designed specifically to reinforce royal 
justice in the wake of the massacres and the threat of rebellion. Notably, it was decided to 
pursue the leading Huguenot commanders, Montgomery in Normandy and the sieur de 
Montbrun in Dauphiné, and to take them to trial. First, though, the monarchy had to deal with 
a threat much closer to home, as evidence of plots was reported from within the French court 
itself. Most significantly of all, these circumstances provided the crown with the chance to set 
an example and to assert royal authority through a commission of ‘extraordinary’ justice. The 





The massacres of 1572 had increased confessional tensions, while also making both the 
French crown and the remaining Huguenot leadership nervous about each other’s intentions. 
                                                          
9 Correspondance diplomatique de Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénélon, ambassadeur de France en 
Angleterre de 1568 à 1575 (1840), vii, 331-2; Jouanna, Devoir de révolte, 134-6. 
10 Correspondance diplomatique, 338; S. Goulart, Mémoires de l’estat de France sous Charles Neufiesme, i 
(1577), 750, 752-3. 
11 A. d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle (Maillé, 1618), ii, 19, lists the survivors. 
12 A[rchives ]H[istoriques de la ]P[réfecture de ]P[olice], AB, Reg.4, fo.115v (27 Oct). 
13 Jouanna, St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 105-6. 
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At court, the strains and stresses encompassed personal animosities between the families of 
Montmorency and Guise and the increasing paranoia of François d’Alençon, and his new 
brother-in-law, Henri de Navarre. It is not surprising, then, that in the early months of 1574, 
there were two attempts by their supporters to get the princes away from the court. The first, 
in February, the so-called ‘effroi de Saint-Germain’, was quickly uncovered, but the second 
appeared altogether more sinister.14 With Charles IX in failing health and the absence of his 
heir, Henri, the crown was receptive to the suggestion that there was a plot to remove them 
all in favour of Alençon. The duc’s recent diplomatic contacts with England and the Empire 
now took on a more suspicious aspect. The subsequent trials of those involved in the alleged 
plot included Alençon’s favourite, Joseph de Boniface, sieur de La Molle, and the captain of 
his guard, Annibal de Coconat. Furthermore, one of the principal judges, Christophe de Thou, 
father of Jacques-Auguste, asserted that the Montmorencies and certain Huguenots had taken 
advantage of Alençon.15 Protestant sources insisted that the accused were interrogated on the 
basis of trumped up charges. It was said that an agent of the chancellor had procured the main 
witness, Yves de Brinon, to ‘play the required role’ in making the accusations, and that he 
was one of twenty-five spies employed by the queen mother.16 The veracity of the claims that 
the conspirators’ plan went far beyond a foiled plot to free the princes is not of concern here. 
The fact that the crown believed that this was possible is much more significant for shaping 
how it responded and its use of violence to resolve the issues which emerged. 
 The extraordinary commission which was established in Paris to investigate the 
‘damnable, wicked and malicious conspiracy’ carried out by La Molle and Coconat and their 
                                                          
14 Discours de l’entreprise de Sainct-Germain, fin de février 1574, reprinted in Archives curieuses, 107-18; 
Négociations diplomatiques, iii, 905-7 (5 Mar.). 
15 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 36-9. 
16 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 199; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, ii, 120. 
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accomplices, in April 1574, acted under direct royal instruction.17 It was led by the senior 
presidents of the Parlement (de Thou) and of the Tournelle (Pierre Hennequin), assisted by 
two lay councillors. As befit a treason trial, the judges were granted full powers, including 
permission to arrest anyone, regardless of status.18 All other judicial cases were suspended 
and the proceedings, from arrest through interrogation and torture to judgement and 
execution, took three weeks.19 The remarkable details of the trial provide intriguing insights 
into the anxieties on all sides and the febrile atmosphere in Paris and, in particular, at the 
court.20 Nowhere is this clearer than in the depositions of the young princes of the blood. 
Navarre in particular lamented the position in which he had been put.21 His testimony is 
striking; at just twenty years old he lacked the sense of invincibility which his succession to 
the throne and survival of numerous assassination attempts would later give him. While 
making clear his track record of loyalty to, and affection for, the royal family, he highlighted 
the shame that he felt at having brought his close friends and companions with him to Paris 
only to see them slaughtered, leaving him ‘alone, stripped of his friends and of trust’.22 
Furthermore, he observed resentfully that the crown had no grounds for suspicion of him, 
whereas he had been told that the plan was to undertake ‘a second St Bartholomew’ which 
would spare neither him nor Alençon. Navarre also claimed to have heard that, if La Rochelle 
had fallen the previous year, then the Huguenots and their allies (including new Catholics like 
                                                          
17 B[ibliothèque ]n[ationale de ]F[rance], MS Dupuy 590, fo.21; ‘Documens originaux relatifs au rôle du duc 
d’Alençon, sous les règnes des rois Charles IX et Henri III, ses frères, et à l’histoire du tiers-parti’, Revue 
rétrospective, 5 (1836), 235-6; De Crue, Le Parti, 181-2.  
18 S.H. Cuttler, The Laws of Treason: Treason Trials in Late Medieval France (Cambridge, 1981). On 21 May, 
a further 21 named individuals were ordered to be apprehended: BnF, MS Dupuy 590, fo.23; AN, U//785, fos 
121, 123-4; ‘Documens originaux’, 237. 
19 BnF, MS Dupuy 590, fo.21; ‘Documens originaux’, 236, judges ordered to proceed regardless of holidays; 
AN, X2a, 941, the plumitifs indicate time taken off for Easter, although ‘la court fut aux prisonniers de la 
conciergerye et du grand chatelet’ on 7 Apr. My thanks to Tom Hamilton for help with this reference. 
20 Archives curieuses, 127-221, are a faithful reproduction of Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 208-81. Unfortunately, the 
conciergerie register, AHPP, AB, Reg.4, is incomplete for this period. 
21 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 219-25, 250-4; Archives curieuses, 143-51 (13 Apr.), 181-6 (18 Apr.); BnF, MS 
fr[ançais] 3969, fos 21-24r; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, ii, 121. 
22 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 221; Archives curieuses, 146; BnF, MS fr 3969, fo.22r. 
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himself) would have been killed, and if his wife had a son (thereby securing the succession) 
he would not live long. Furthermore, he and Alençon were outraged at the order to search 
their rooms and he felt ‘great shame’ at being refused entry to the king’s bedchamber in the 
presence of other gentlemen.23 Meanwhile, the crown promoted his enemies and the 
perpetrators of St Bartholomew, and he had to put up with disparaging remarks that with the 
‘house of Bourbon, there is always war’. All in all, this provided Navarre with more than 
enough ‘just and apparent occasion’ to escape.24 This was not a matter of treason, therefore, 
but of self-defence. Alençon asserted that he had resisted any overtures to join the rebellion 
or to act against his brother, Henri, but that their followers often fell out with one another.25 
He defended the ‘steadfast and loyal’ La Molle’s role in informing the crown about the 
previous plot in February, and claimed that he had warned him not to be misled this time, 
although the others distrusted him.26 Such tensions between the conspirators cannot have 
aided their cause. While implicating the prince de Condé, both Alençon and Navarre reported 
the central role of Guillaume de Thoré, the youngest of the Montmorency brothers. La Molle 
would later describe him as ‘evil’ and the ‘cause of everything’.27 
The interrogation and torture of La Molle and Coconat is also revealing about the 
relationships between the grands and their followers. The two protagonists took very 
different approaches to their situation. La Molle denied all knowledge of the plot, stating that 
he had ‘only done what M. le duc commanded of him’ and that Alençon had always been a 
‘good brother to the king’.28 Later, confronted by a statement from the duc incriminating him, 
he questioned its authenticity and whether it was extracted under duress, and requested that 
                                                          
23 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 223-4; Archives curieuses, 149. 
24 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 253, 225; Archives curieuses, 185, 151; BnF, MS fr 3969, fo.24r. 
25 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 213-19; Archives curieuses, 136-43 (13 Apr.); BnF, MS fr 3969, fos18-21r. 
26 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 217-18; Archives curieuses, 141-2; 208-9 (30 Apr.); d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, 
ii, 119; de Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 44, that La Molle simply revealed what could no longer be hidden. 
27 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 273; Archives curieuses, 211 (30 Apr.). 
28 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 209; Archives curieuses, 131 (11 Apr.); BnF, MS fr 3969, fos 24v-25; de Thou, 
Histoire universelle, vii, 50; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, ii, 120. 
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he be allowed to see his master.29 Coconat, by contrast, was permitted to go straight before 
Charles IX and to confess everything; traditionally, such a ploy could result in exoneration, 
but not on this occasion. Intentionally or not, he gave the crown what it wanted: proof that the 
plot went further than freeing the princes to betraying the kingdom in alliance with the 
English and the Germans, itself sparked by the duc’s suspicions of a plot to eliminate him and 
Navarre.30 Other testimonies would reveal that these fears involved supposed collusion with 
Spain. Correspondence intercepted between Philip II and Catherine allegedly sought advice 
on how best to dispose of a family member, as Philip reputedly did his son, Carlos.31 
Despite these apparently very real (and in many ways well-grounded) fears, princes of 
the blood could usually count on a reprimand rather than a prosecution. Alençon, Navarre and 
the prince de Condé were protected by their status, especially at a time of great uncertainty 
about the royal succession. As far as possible, the monarchy sought to avoid bringing 
aristocrats to trial for treason before the Parlement, the ultimate seat of sovereign justice, 
although Condé’s father, Louis, had faced prosecution in 1560.32 In the charged 
circumstances after St Bartholomew, no-one was quite sure how the situation might have 
changed and everyone was nervous. The uncertainty regarding Alençon’s sympathies 
contributed both to Catholic suspicion of his intentions and Protestant optimism about his 
support for their cause. The safeguarding of the agents and clients of such figures was much 
less certain, as seen in the fates of La Molle, and Condé’s secretary, Jean Abraham. They can 
be seen as ciphers, their executions for treason in 1574 and 1575 symbolic both of the 
discontent with their protectors’ actions and of the failure of that protection to save them. 
Once sentenced and with nothing more to lose, La Molle began to recount how he had been 
obliged a hundred times by the duc on his life and all he held dear to say nothing, before 
                                                          
29 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 243-5, 267; Archives curieuses, 173-5 (15 Apr.); 204 (30 Apr.). 
30 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 210-13; Archives curieuses, 132-6 (12 Apr.); BnF, MS fr 3969, fos 26-27r, 32v-36r. 
31 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 253; Archives curieuses, 185; G. Parker, Philip II (Chicago, 2002), 92-4. 
32 On the role of Parlement and the infrequency of treason trials, Cuttler, Laws of Treason. 
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finally confessing his involvement.33 Charles IX was allegedly overjoyed to hear of his 
execution, while the distraught Alençon took to his bed.34 La Molle, Coconat and Abraham 
were rapidly dispatched once due judicial process had exposed their supposedly treacherous 
designs.35 And they were not the only ones in these tense years of 1574-75. 
There had been growing discontent with royal policy among the higher nobility, much 
of it focused on marshal François de Montmorency, whose moderation made him respected 
by both sides.36 Suspected of sympathy with the malcontent position, François and his cousin 
and fellow marshal, Artus de Cossé, were imprisoned in the Bastille.37 Furthermore, 
according to Charles IX’s own account, the conspiracy trial interrogations made it clear that 
the two marshals and their kinsman, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, were ‘the principal 
authors’ of the plot.38 Directly following the conviction of la Molle and Coconat, the king 
requested that president de Thou and the others involved in trying the case come to see him, 
so that he might be ‘well informed about the things which had resulted from their trial’.39 He 
also sought guidance from the Parlement about the ‘best way’ to proceed with regard to the 
marshals and how those of their status had been customarily prosecuted ‘heretofore’.40 
Although Montmorency and Cossé were never tried, they would be detained for eighteen 
months, despite the change of regime. Following their release, however, as an indication of 
renewed trust, they were sent to negotiate with Alençon and his allies, including Damville, 
who had managed to evade capture. 
Several others among the accused had been able to flee, notably the younger 
Montmorency brothers, Charles de Méru and Guillaume de Thoré, as well as their nephew, 
                                                          
33 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 269; Archives curieuses, 206 (30 Apr.); BnF, MS fr 3969, fos 29-32. 
34 C[alendar of ]S[tate ]P[apers ]F[oreign], 70/131, fo.3 (2 May 1574). 
35 BnF, MS fr 3969, fo.36v; AN, U//785, fo.118; CSPF, 70/130, fos 223, 227 (27 & 30 Apr.). 
36 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 38-9, of ‘rare probity … enemy of all faction’; Haton, Mémoires, ii, 392, 
‘held to be a Huguenot but not a rebel’. 
37 Archives curieuses, 121-6. 
38 BnF, MS fr 3201, fo.73 (4 May); AN, U//785, fo.122 (7 May). 
39 BnF, MS Dupuy 801, fos 85-6 (1 May). 
40 BnF, MS Dupuy 590, fo.27; ‘Documens originaux’, 241 (7 May). 
 11 
Henri de La Tour, vicomte de Turenne. They also included two of Alençon’s chamberlains, 
the seigneur de Grandchamp and Jacques de La Nocle, at whose house most of the plotting 
allegedly took place.41 Of those remaining to be tried, François de Tourtay, secretary to 
Grandchamp, was the first to be executed, nearly a week before La Molle and Coconat.42 
Pierre de Grandry, brother of Grandchamp, was freed through family connections; their 
maternal uncle was Sébastien de L’Aubespine, bishop of Limoges and royal councillor.43 
While the Italian astrologer, Cosme Ruggieri, was later reprieved through the intervention of 
his patron, Catherine de Medici, his treatment reveals wider concerns.44 His role was 
explored during the interrogations of La Molle and Tourtay, as well as the statement by 
Coconat in which he emphasised that La Molle and Ruggieri were hand in glove.45 Questions 
focused on the use of a wax figure found among La Molle’s belongings. He was pushed hard 
on its significance by suspicious judges in his final torture session on the day of his 
execution, but La Molle continued to protest that it was not of the king, but of a woman he 
had hoped to seduce.46 During the trial, Jean de La Guesle, conseiller du roi and procureur-
général au parlement, acted as go-between with the commissioners on behalf of the king and 
queen mother. Catherine sought to deflect blame from Ruggieri onto La Molle and the need 
to check his lodgings for ‘malevolent things’. When arrested, Ruggieri had allegedly asked if 
the king was vomiting and bleeding and his head hurt, and Catherine ordered La Guesle to 
instruct the commissioners to investigate whether enchantment had been involved in 
procuring the king’s illness and, indeed, Alençon’s infatuation with La Molle.47 It was 
                                                          
41 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 202; Negociations diplomatiques, 914-16 (14 Apr.). 
42 BnF, MS fr 3969, fo.36v; Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 262; Archives curieuses, 195-6. 
43 De Thou, Histoire universelle, vii, 54. 
44 Negociations diplomatiques, iii, 920-1 (26 Apr.), 923 (1 May), 928-9 (4 May); de Thou, Histoire universelle, 
vii, 54; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, ii, 121, that he was a ‘sorcier’ and Catherine employed him as such. 
45 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 259, 268, 272, 275-7; Archives curieuses, 192-3, 205, 210, 214-16. 
46 Goulart, Mémoires, iii, 271-3; Archives curieuses, 209-11. 
47 BNF, Dupuy 590, fos 24, 26 (29 & 26 Apr.); ‘Documens originaux’, 238-40; CSPF, 70/130, fo.223 (27 Apr.).  
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evident during the interrogation that the use of sorcery to violent ends was to be explored by 
the judges as posing a very real threat. 
Fear was at the heart of the reaction of all parties to the St Bartholomew’s Day 
massacres, whether among the surviving Huguenots, including those that had converted, or 
the royal authorities anxious about reprisal and foreign intervention. The ‘effroi’ of Saint-
Germain was claimed to have been set up to justify ‘another St Bartholomew’s day’, and 
Montgomery was summoned to Normandy from England to ‘resist the new enterprises 
tending to a second massacre’.48 When Turenne and Thoré came to treat on behalf of the 
king, Montgomery reported that the memory of St Bartholomew was too fresh for them to be 
deceived again.49 Rumours spread of a new massacre in Paris in March and the Florentine 
ambassador asserted that the Huguenots had ‘fear of another St Bartholomew’, and that their 
struggle was no longer to uphold their religion but to save their lives.50 Navarre also 
mentioned it twice in his testimonies.51 Catholics, too, were prone to believe tales of 
conspiracy, including incriminating evidence against the plotters from supposed ‘discoveries’ 
of secret letters and active conspirators.52 When Antoine de Saint-Paul claimed that his 
nephew, Saint-Martin-des-Pierres, had boasted that as a result of the plot there would be 
blood running through the streets, Saint-Martin denied it except as an everyday expression 
that he might have used, but it doubtless stirred up fears of reprisal for the massacres.53 Such 
rumours were, thus, swirling around the court and in Paris even twenty months after the 
event, and royal fears of further rebellion continued for three years after and right up until the 
peace made with the Huguenots and their allies in 1576. 
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At the same time in April 1574 as La Molle and Coconat were being interrogated in Paris, the 
lieutenant-governor of Normandy, Jacques de Matignon, was under royal instruction to seize 
the Huguenot commander, the comte de Montgomery.54 The notorious jousting opponent of 
Henri II on the day in 1559 that the king was fatally wounded in the lists, Montgomery had 
since been active in the various theatres of war on the Huguenot side and, along the way, had 
made many enemies as well as attracted many supporters. He was a notable survivor of the St 
Bartholomew’s Day massacres and went on to ally with England against the crown. In La 
Molle’s initial interrogation, he was asked if Montgomery was in any way implicated in the 
plot, but his name was never mentioned again during the trial. Likewise Montgomery would 
deny any involvement, a view upheld by several commentators, although his recent contact 
with some of the plotters might suggest otherwise.55 Montgomery was seized in May 1574, 
shortly after Montmorency and Cossé were detained, and subsequently transferred to the 
conciergerie in Paris to be tried.56 His imprisonment coincided with the brief period of 
Catherine de Medici’s regency between the death of Charles IX and the return of Henri III 
from Poland. Just a month after his arrest, he was condemned to death for treason by 
decapitation in the place de Grève, deprived of noble status, and all his possessions 
confiscated (and therefore his heirs disinherited) by the crown; exactly the same traitor’s fate 
as that of La Molle and Coconat. 
Montgomery’s death is a good example of the politicization of religious execution in 
the post St Bartholomew’s era. While Catholic reports emphasized his treacherous actions 
and Protestant accounts his unwavering faith, he was also said to have withstood torture and 
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refused to implicate marshals Montmorency and Cossé. Other observers saw it differently, 
stating that the queen mother had, thus, got her long-sought revenge for her husband’s 
death.57 But it did not require a long-held personal vendetta to understand why the crown 
might have wanted Montgomery out of the way. His activities in supporting the rebels of La 
Rochelle and wreaking havoc in the province of Normandy made him a threat to the whole 
kingdom, as both Charles IX and Catherine de Medici wrote to Matignon, for his capture 
would bring ‘repose to these unfortunate lands’.58 Nevertheless, despite the crown’s concerns, 
there was not the royal delight that we might have expected at his death. Catherine reported it 
only briefly towards the end of a very long letter.59 
Despite, indeed because of, the extent of Montgomery’s exploits over many years and 
much of France, the crown declared that he was to be subjected to ‘fair and exemplary 
justice’.60 We may compare this to the exchange between Coconat and his judges after he was 
sentenced, when he questioned whether the king would not prefer to see a good servant 
spared. He was told that above all the king ‘wants to see justice done’.61 It was customary 
practice to institute a swift judicial process in the case of accusations of treason, especially if 
it involved collaboration with foreign powers, but its application was rare during the wars. 
Worthy of note, too, is the propaganda war provoked by Montgomery’s fate. Was it the death 
of a brave man or a coward? Haton reported that he surrendered ‘shamefully’, and claimed 
that Montgomery knew that Charles IX had been poisoned.62 De Thou, by contrast, asserted 
that he had endured his torture ‘courageously’ and gone to his death with an ‘assured 
expression’ and ‘admirable constancy’, even jokingly admitting that he found magistrates 
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more intimidating than armies.63 Catherine, for her part, excused the speed with which 
Montgomery was judged and dispatched, having said that she had hoped to await the arrival 
of Henri III, but that her hand was forced by the popular agitation that his presence caused.64 
Even Protestant commentators report the hatred which the inhabitants of Paris felt towards 
him, but also that he was viewed more with pity than with spite.65 
Montgomery’s downfall was, therefore, part of a more complex political context 
which saw the crown using judicial violence to curtail the threat and quell the ambition of a 
religious minority which could not be successfully defeated in the field or brought to the 
negotiating table. The St Bartholomew’s Day massacres had not been successful in this 
endeavour and had, in fact, made the threat greater by exacerbating both Protestant and 
Catholic noble discontent with the crown and providing the Huguenots with new allies. The 
monarchy’s inability to remove the key players led to the humiliating negotiation of the Edict 
of Beaulieu (or Peace of Monsieur) in 1576 and a further Catholic backlash. The subsequent 
rise of the League, under the leadership of the house of Guise, would dominate and distort the 




Prior to the 1572 massacres (and again from 1576), each peace edict exonerated those 
accused of ‘religious’ activities and the judicial record was wiped clean, leading to the 
freeing of many prisoners. The practice of pardoning those involved in the religious wars 
during times of peace, and the safe conducts issued in these cases, had long proved 
problematic for the French crown in dealing with subversion. In the wake of the massacres, 
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however, such individuals were not to be let off so lightly, especially if their actions could be 
associated with treason. Arrests for the secret carrying and distribution of correspondence are 
one example. In the summer of 1575, Jean Abraham, secretary of Henri, prince de Condé, 
was captured and executed for this offence. He was taken on his way to England ‘charged 
with packets and memoirs concerning the state of the king and of his realm’, and quickly 
transferred to Paris to face trial. As a result of interrogation and torture, he allegedly declared 
‘secrets and plots of great importance’ against the crown.66 He was condemned ‘by order of 
the king’ to be hanged and quartered in the place de Grève and his body parts displayed.67 
Others reported that ‘they that were at his condemnation affirm there was neither matter nor 
proof against him, and so he protested at his death’.68 
Abraham was severely treated because of his close links to Condé. Catherine de 
Medici, Henri III and the cardinal of Bourbon, Condé’s uncle, wrote to the prince to inform 
him that Abraham’s execution was well deserved, ‘for very just and reasonable causes to 
which he had confessed and was proven under his seal that he had wanted to offer six 
thousand écus to have the king killed’. Meanwhile, Condé was reminded of his ‘natural’ duty 
to serve the king, his blood relative, and advised that he should ‘embrace what is worthy of 
the place from which you have issued’.69 He was also severely reprimanded by the crown for 
nurturing and listening to treacherous individuals, which was said to cast suspicion both on 
the sincerity of his own obedience to the crown and his dedication to the peace. Considering 
that Condé had been in exile in the Empire since the revelation of the supposed conspiracy at 
the French court in which he was implicated, his loyalty was already more than in doubt. 
Another source specifically implicates Alençon, postulating that, by the letters, ‘it was known 
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that the tragedy that was being played out in France was in his name and by his authority’.70 
Executed alongside Abraham was Saint-Martin, the last of the prisoners interrogated about 
the alleged conspiracy the year before, and safeguarded up to that point by Alençon’s favour. 
More sinister still was the presence of extra-judicial violence at the edges of these 
executions and conflicts, often involving royal favourites, which suggests that the crown had 
less control of the situation than it sought. Among other violent acts was the murder of 
Moissonière, a Norman captain, who had been captured with his son alongside Abraham. He 
was released only to be killed by François d’O, one of Henri III’s so-called mignons, as he 
returned to his lodging.71 A similar fate befell Henri’s favourites, Louis de Bérenger Le Guast 
and Jean Janowitz de Besme, both notorious for their involvement in the 1572 massacres.72 
Le Guast had several aggressive confrontations with Thoré and Alençon’s followers, 
including just prior to the 1574 trial, and was subsequently murdered in his bed.73 L’Estoile 
describes him as ‘superb and audacious, inflated by the favour of his master’, but through 
divine retribution atoning for all the innocent blood that he had spilt. Navarre mentions him 
in the same breath as his fears of a second St Bartholomew.74 Henri III’s open hostility to his 
previous followers, La Molle and Coconat, is significant in understanding both their actions 
and the response of his entourage to them.75 Le Guast had served alongside both of them at 
La Rochelle and, like La Molle, had been seriously injured as part of a distinguished military 
career. He was generally seen to control access to Henri to the extent that Marguerite de 
Navarre blamed him for poisoning the relations of their brother with her and Alençon.76 
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The papers seized on Abraham were said to reveal the extent of English engagement 
with such rebels as if they were at ‘open war’ with France. Intercepted letters had already 
indicated unlimited English support for the Huguenots, and the French crown requested that 
Elizabeth desist from granting aid to Montgomery and others ‘openly or clandestinely’ 
contrary to the bonds of amity and the treaty between them.77 The flying of the English cross 
of St George by the fleet that went to aid La Rochelle was particularly provocative, and a 
year later, Charles IX asserted that Montgomery was still planning the ‘ruin of my 
kingdom’.78 English interest in the 1574 trials was considerable and unsurprising in view of 
the involvement of Alençon and his followers, several of whom had been recently present at 
the English court on behalf of their master, and of Montgomery, a frequent visitor and 
consistent ally. Notably, La Molle had been actively representing the French crown in 
negotiations with the English when the St Bartholomew’s Day massacres took place, 
returning to France shortly thereafter.79 Elizabeth tried to intervene in his favour via her 
ambassador, describing him as ‘very honest’ and that she did not believe that he had the 
‘heart to make mischief’. In response, Catherine de Medici stated that his crimes could not be 
excused and added that La Molle had been ‘nourished closely by us’ and favoured like a 




Valentine Dale, the English ambassador, reporting on Abraham’s execution, commented that, 
‘They have had Montbrun to Grenoble in Dauphiny to do the like to him.’81 Thus, 
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Montgomery was not the only Huguenot commander to be summarily executed at this time. 
The following year, Charles du Puy, sieur de Montbrun and military leader in Dauphiné, met 
the same fate in much the same circumstances, but at Grenoble rather than in Paris. There are 
notable similarities in the two commanders’ experiences and the way that they were treated. 
Montbrun had already fallen foul of the crown several times over many years. In 1574, he 
caused personal offence to Henri III, on his return to the kingdom, by blocking the passage of 
his entourage across a bridge in Dauphiné and pillaging its baggage, feeding the ‘incredible 
hatred’ of the king.82 Despite this, it is argued that a later attempt by the crown to reconcile 
with him was rebuffed, as with Montgomery, an important part of justifying both their 
condemnations. Once again, the royal commander in the region, lieutenant general de Gordes, 
was instructed specifically to go after Montbrun. Once captured, Henri III urged Gordes and 
the parlement de Grenoble to bring him to justice for lèse majesté.83 Like Matignon before 
him, Gordes was vilified for handing Montbrun over to his enemies, damaging his previously 
moderate and equitable reputation.84 
In the wake of his death, contemporaries presented Montbrun as both a fanatical 
Calvinist convert, murderer, thief and brigand, and a military hero, valiant soldier and man of 
principle who was ‘resolute and determined’.85 Commonly known as ‘the brave’ or ‘the 
valiant’, Montbrun’s death was viewed as violating the laws of war.86 All concur that he was 
so seriously injured before his capture that he had to be carried to the scaffold. Gordes 
confirmed this, and the sieur de Hautefort reported that his wounds were so painful that he 
could neither walk nor ride.87 Some felt that by its undue haste the crown showed excessive 
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and gratuitous cruelty as Montbrun would have died of his injuries anyway. ‘It would have 
been good if he had been killed in combat’ Hautefort wrote, rather than face justice, since this 
‘will alarm the Huguenots and make us no more favourable to the protestant cantons’. His 
principal concern was the disastrous effect that the commander’s execution might have on the 
chances for peace in the region.88 Condé and other Protestant leaders tried in vain to save 
Montbrun’s life. Reputedly, the king granted him a pardon, but the document arrived two 
hours too late to save him, reminiscent of the late appeal to have La Molle and Coconat 
spared an ignominious public execution. 
Noble honour (and its converse, dishonour or shame) was a recurring theme in royal 
and aristocratic rhetoric and justified the use of violence and other forms of resistance. The 
issue of honour, both individual and familial, loomed large in the trials of 1574-75. This 
included the shame of Navarre at his treatment, as well as the dishonour caused to the ‘poor 
race’ of La Molle who had sacrificed so much for the crown.89 When the accused were 
confronted with their accusers, each sought to discredit the other’s integrity and, therefore, 
their testimony. As well as denying all knowledge of the plot, Saint-Martin was extremely 
keen to clear his name with regard to the accusations of fraud made against him.90 A principal 
concern of the condemned was that they should have an honourable death in accordance with 
their status: a private execution at night for La Molle and Coconat, and beheading rather than 
hanging for Tourtay.91 None of these requests, despite the intervention of Alençon for La 
Molle and Condé for Montbrun, was granted. Montgomery and Montbrun’s safe-conducts 
were also overridden and they both sought a noble death. Their swift dispatch shocked their 
peers and discredited those responsible for handing them over to the ruthless application of 
royal justice. Status was important in these instances. Royal action against the second tier of 
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the nobility was calculated and the sentences were carried out quickly in full public view for 
maximum effect. 
Another recurring theme in royal rhetoric was the admonition to potential 
troublemakers abroad to behave in keeping with their lineage. In April 1574, Charles IX 
warned Condé to ensure that his followers ‘live peacefully in their houses’ in order to ‘restore 
repose to this kingdom’, but that if they ‘became hardened in their wrongdoing’ he would 
‘pursue them vociferously by force’.92 Thoré’s obedience was expected and offered, as 
appropriate to his house and his honour, acting always ‘as a man of my birth ought’. He 
would have to behave if he was to benefit from royal goodwill, or ‘you will do wrong to the 
father whose issue you are’, and in view of the precarious position of other members of his 
family languishing in prison.93 Montgomery, too, had been warned to stay in England and not 
to stir up further trouble by the king, ‘without undertaking anything contrary to my service … 
as do my other good and loyal subjects’ which would be ‘better for your honour’.94 His return 




The prosecution of both Huguenots and Catholics for participation in plots served to 
vindicate the non-confessional position the crown had adopted with regard to St 
Bartholomew’s Day. As with its duty to uphold the edicts of pacification and to safeguard the 
‘bien public’, this was a policy consciously focused on subversion and ‘malign conspiracy’ 
rather than religious belief.95 It also promoted the primacy of royal authority and, in 
particular, of royal justice. Charles IX observed that the conspirators were to be tried by 
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members of the Parlement ‘by whom any accused man in this realm desires to be judged 
rather than by any others, because of the great and singular integrity for which they are 
recognized’. On the conspirators, he stated, 
Their fate will serve as a good example to all those who have such evil enterprises in  
their hearts as those they have attempted; for it can be said that, during the hearing  
and judgement of their trial, they have been treated with the greatest sincerity, and  
matters weighed with the greatest possible respect, and that if an excuse could be  
found for them it has been deployed.96 
Theirs was to be viewed, therefore, as a fair prosecution with a just outcome. 
In order to ‘see justice done’, however, there was little to be gained for the crown by 
pursuing the princes of the blood and other aristocrats, but rather to go after the next rung of 
the nobility. In order to reduce the effectiveness of the Huguenot opposition, for instance, 
their commanders in the field were targeted. Both Montgomery and Montbrun had been a 
thorn in the side of the crown throughout the first three wars and even before. They had 
already been condemned for treason, so this ‘moment’ had been long in the making and was 
now exacerbated by real fears of a malcontent coup. In 1560, those involved in the 
conspiracy of Amboise had been executed by hanging, drowning or beheading and their 
corpses displayed on the battlements of the royal chateau as a warning to others.97 The 
severity of the violence used against those implicated in the alleged plots of 1574/75 was 
similarly unrestrained. Conversely, Charles IX emphasized the closeness of his relationship 
with, and complete trust in, his brothers Alençon and Navarre, their ‘true and perfect 
friendship and good understanding’, a matter of weeks before evidence emerged of their 
involvement in a conspiracy, at the very least, to challenge his authority. Even thereafter, he 
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continued to maintain their innocence and to deny any malicious intent.98 By contrast, he 
stated that La Molle and Coconat had recognized,  
before undergoing their final torture, that they had been deservedly and justifiably  
condemned to death … (and) they were found so guilty that they confessed  
themselves worthy of a much more cruel death than that which they had suffered.99 
The evident discrepancy in treatment, however, was explicitly stated in their final 
interrogations, with Coconat declaring ruefully that ‘the petits are punished, and the grands 
whose fault it is remain’.100 
When it came to over-mighty subjects among the highest ranking nobility, 
imprisonment and house arrest were the only options that the crown would pursue. Those 
who fled or were out of reach, such as the younger Montmorencies and Condé, could at best 
only be admonished to act in accordance with their status and honour, but repeated resistance 
risked confiscation, condemnation and disgrace. In the 1520s, the defection of Charles duc de 
Bourbon (great uncle of Navarre and Condé) to the Emperor Charles V had resulted in the 
confiscation of his title and lands, while the alliance of the duc de Montmorency (son of 
Damville) with Louis XIII’s brother in the 1630s had led to his execution. At both these 
points, the crown was more secure than was the case in 1570s, although they also 
demonstrate that the potential for plots and treason were never far away. In 1574, the crown 
was dealing with an uncertain situation and a new generation on both sides of the 
confessional divide whose impetuosity needed to be brought into line. Both Alençon and 
Condé were told that they needed to be more careful from whom they sought advice, also 
suggesting that their youth might excuse their being misled on this occasion, but would not 
protect them in future. The confessional dimension is also crucial to understanding the 
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differences with the period of the religious wars. The political and self-interested loyalties of 
younger brothers and high-ranking subjects were always a threat, but the existential 
framework of divided duties to God and king provided another less clear-cut perspective in 
which foreign powers also had a more vested interest than the purely political. This religious 
dimension also provided a powerful counter narrative to the crown’s claims to be acting 
against traitors not martyrs, and it provided the ultimate justification for regicide. 
Aristocratic discontent was also manifest in these plots, as a reaction to the perceived 
royal attack on the grands in France and beyond, marked by noble executions and the St 
Bartholomew’s Day massacres. This was at least some of the basis of the justification for 
their actions put forward by Condé, Alençon, Navarre and Damville, among others.101 
Contemporaries were fully aware of the parallels with the recent actions of monarchs 
elsewhere in Europe in dealing with treacherous behaviour as a result of confessional 
division. Philip II of Spain took a hard-line in dealing with the leaders of the Dutch Revolt, 
with the counts of Egmont and Hoorne publicly executed in Brussels in 1568. Less well-
known is the demise of Hoorne’s younger brother, the baron de Montigny. Having led a 
delegation to Spain and been placed under house arrest, Montigny was eventually sentenced 
to death, but was instead garrotted in secret in October 1570.102 Their deaths had a particular 
impact in France because Hoorne and Montigny were members of the extended 
Montmorency family. De Thou writes of the memory of their ‘shameful death’ and that they 
were ‘unworthily executed’.103 In England, too, Queen Elizabeth faced several revolts, 
including the Northern Rebellion of 1569 and the Ridolfi plot of 1570. Both the earl of 
Northumberland and the duke of Norfolk were beheaded for their part in these events in the 
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summer of 1572.104 Taking place as they did before the executions of Montgomery and 
Montbrun, these examples may have been looked to as models by the French crown, 
especially after the debacle of St Bartholomew. In all these cases, the accusation of treason 
was paramount in justifying a conviction. 
In line with earlier legislation to enforce the peace, the trials of 1574 were erased from 
the Parlement’s registers by order of the king through the 1576 Edict of Beaulieu. This 
marked a return to coexistence with the Huguenots, now that their commanders had been 
conveniently dispatched, the situation calmed and agreement reached with Alençon and the 
other malcontents. A clear indication of the prominence of the duc’s influence over the terms 
of the edict was that La Molle and Coconat were the first to be exonerated, followed by 
Coligny, then Montgomery, Montbrun, Briquemault and Cavaignes.105 Importantly, for the 
reputation of their name and families, all had their sentences revoked and annulled and all 
record and memorials or accounts of their condemnation were ordered to be erased and their 
heirs no longer disinherited. Reflecting concern that previous actions had not been explicitly 
excused, the vidame de Chartres and his brother-in-law, Jean de Beauvoir La Nocle (brother 
of Jacques), were cleared for their part in negotiating a separate Huguenot peace with 
England in 1562, alongside grand royal declarations of the fraternal and cousinly affection 
held towards the ‘dear and beloved’ Alençon, Navarre, Condé and Damville.106 
This general amnesty followed the crown’s application of ‘extraordinary’ justice to 
rebels and traitors in contrast to the arbitrary violence of St Bartholomew. If the process was 
thus made more legitimate, avoiding the outrage prompted by assassination and murder, its 
erasure from the record might be thought to delegitimize it. Yet restitution was also a 
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necessary part of royal justice, demonstrating monarchical clemency. At any rate, in the heat 
of victory and compromise, no-one was interested in raising the issue, not least the newly 
titled duc d’Anjou. After 1576, he was happy to exploit his royal status to pursue his 
ambitions, and no doubt welcomed the initially more conciliatory and moderate atmosphere 
at his brother’s court. The Huguenots as well no longer needed the duc’s less than reliable 
support with the leadership of Condé and Navarre now firmly re-established and 




The executions of 1574-75 were not a bid for a state monopoly of violence, but a royal 
attempt to assert control, played out largely in response to events and the perceived threat 
from opponents of the regime. It reveals the weakness of the monarchy to act decisively 
against the most influential figures on both sides, restricted to extreme acts of assassination or 
hasty executions which achieved little.107 Alliances with foreign rulers were significant in 
increasing the alarm of the authorities at a heightened threat to, and accusations of treason 
against, the French polity not just the crown. Yet, the execution of these commanders and the 
agents or favourites of the great acted as a warning shot but little else. The use of the 
judiciary in condemning the sword nobility is perhaps more telling, acting as royal agents of 
justice and demonstrating that such figures were not above the law (unlike their masters). The 
requirement to provide evidence of treason, largely through confessions extracted by torture, 
could be seen as both a weakness and a strength, an indication of the limits of royal authority 
to pursue those most at fault, but also the legitimacy of royal justice. 
                                                          
107 CSPF, 70/135, fo.127 (13 Sept.1575): on Admiral Coligny’s son replacing Montbrun in Dauphiné, the 
actions of vicomte Turenne, and the seizure of Captain St André ‘committed to prison with La Molle’. 
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These events cast a long shadow, shaping French politics for decades to come. They 
loomed over the reign of Henri III which was beset by continuing animosities, tensions and 
clashes between the crown and the nobility which were exacerbated rather than resolved by 
the king’s decision to eliminate his chief rivals, the duc and cardinal de Guise, in December 
1588, and his own murder eight months later. They also shaped his successor, and great 
survivor of the conflict, the first Bourbon king, Henri IV, for whom it had doubtless been a 
traumatic and formative episode. The threat of regicide was already present in the mid-1570s, 
as it had been in the supposed plots of 1560, 1567 and 1572. The repercussions of the 
assassination of Henri IV in 1610 show that, despite widespread fears, the authorities treated 
suspects with leniency, and no further executions resulted.108 From this perspective, the mid-
1570s should be viewed as a brief window of royal brutality generated by fear at a vulnerable 
moment. It was also one of several violent attempts by the crown and others to seize the 
initiative in the ongoing religious wars. Above all, the royal authorities sought to demonstrate 
that they could uphold order through the controlled and targeted use of extraordinary justice 
in the face of treason and disorder. That they failed to do so explains why these events do not 
have the resonance which they had for contemporaries, as traditional noble discontent 
continued to combine with confessional tensions in a volatile mix. 
                                                          
108 D. Roussel, ‘“Several fanatics who talked only of killing kings”: conspirators and regicides before the 
parlement de Paris in the wake of the assassination of Henri IV, 1610’, French History, 31 (2017), 459-76. 
